Arizona Immigration Law Supreme Court
- octubre 2, 2022
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From the above, one could conclude that after the adoption of the Constitution, there were doubts about the power of the federal government to control immigration, but no doubt about the power of the states to do so. Since its founding (but not immediately), doubts about the power of the federal government have disappeared. In fact, the primary responsibility for immigration policy has shifted from the states to the federal government. Congress exercised its power «to establish a uniform naturalization rule»,art. I, § 8, cl. 4, very early, see A Law Establishing a Uniform Naturalization Rule, 1 Stat. 103. But with the short-lived exception of the Alien Act, Congress did not pass legislation regulating immigration for most of a century. In 1862, Congress passed «a law prohibiting `Kuli trade` by American citizens in American ships,» which «prohibited the purchase of [Chinese nationals]. to dispose of, sell or transfer or be detained for service or work as servants or apprentices for any period of years or for any time whatsoever. 12 Stat. 340. Then, in 1875, Congress amended this law to prohibit the admission of Chinese, Japanese, and Asian immigrants who had «entered into a contract or service agreement in the United States for obscene and immoral purposes.» An Act Supplementing the Immigration Acts, Chap.
141, 18 Stat. 477. And in 1882, Congress passed the first general naturalization act. See Immigration Control Act, 22 Stat. 214. Of course, it is difficult to mention that the Federal Immigration Act is now broad. Second, state laws are anticipated when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, see above, p. 372. These include cases where «compliance with federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,» Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 USA 132, 142-143 (1963), and cases in which the impugned law of the state «constitutes an impediment to the achievement and execution of all the purposes and objectives of Congress,» Hines, 312 U.S., at 67; see also Crosby, op. cit. cit., at p. 373 («What constitutes a sufficient obstacle is a question of discretion to be informed in examining federal law as a whole and determining its object and intended effects»). In the preventive analysis, the courts should assume that «the historic police powers of the states» will not be replaced «unless that is the clear and obvious objective of Congress.» rice, above, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. pp. 555, 565 (2009). Unfortunately, the court ruled that an prejudicial provision of the law can remain in place, at least until the law comes into force and its implementation can be reviewed. This provision requires law enforcement officers to verify the immigration status of a person they are arresting or arresting for other legitimate purposes if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is undocumented. The Court warned that this provision could also be unconstitutional in its application. In practice, the provision may encourage police officers to arrest someone for an alleged traffic violation or a violation of state law to justify investigating their immigration status and report them for deportation.
The Court acknowledged that the provision could be deleted in the future, depending on how it is implemented. Creates a state violation comparable to federal law in 8 USC 1304(e) or 1306(a), and creates state penalties of jail fees and $100 for an initial offense. Stipulates that immigration status may be determined by a federally authorized law enforcement officer to verify the immigration status of a foreign national; or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement or U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Given the predominance of federal immigration restrictions today, it`s easy to lose sight of the traditional role of states in regulating immigration — and neglect their sovereign prerogative to do so. I take it for granted that state regulations are excluded by the Constitution if (1) they have been prohibited by valid federal law, or (2) they are contrary to federal regulations – for example, if they authorize those that would exclude federal regulations or exclude those that federal regulation would allow. The entire mandatory enforcement system created by Arizona law would have a profound impact on immigration enforcement priorities set by Congress and the Department of Homeland Security. Congress has prioritized immigration enforcement to focus resources on deporting people convicted of a crime.
Even as part of this overall priority, Congress has ordered DHS to give the highest priority to deporting people convicted of serious crimes. Requires that immigration status be reviewed by the federal government for any person arrested. The nature and timing of this case are prudent in assessing the validity of § 2 (B). The federal government has filed a lawsuit against a sovereign state to challenge the provision even before the law comes into effect. There is fundamental uncertainty about the meaning of the law and how it will be applied. At this point, without a final interpretation by the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume that § 2(B) will be interpreted in a way that creates a conflict with federal law. See Fox v. Washington, 236 USA 273, 277 (1915) («To the extent that laws can be interpreted fairly to avoid dubious constitutional issues, they should be interpreted as such; and it can be assumed that the laws of the States are interpreted in this way by the courts of the State» (cited omitted)).
As a result, the United States cannot prevail in its current challenge. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. pp. 440, 446 (1960) («To say otherwise would be to ignore the doctrine of the decisions of this court which require seeking conflicts between state and federal regulations when there are not clearly any»). This opinion does not preclude further preventive and constitutional challenges to the law in its interpretation and application after its entry into force. Federalism, which is at the heart of the constitutional conception, adopts the principle that national and state governments have elements of sovereignty that the other must respect.